California Western School of Law

CWSL Scholarly Commons
Faculty Scholarship
2008

“A Painful Process of Waiting”: The New York, Washington, New
Jersey, and Maryland Dissenting Justices Understand that “SameSex Marriage” is Not What Same-Sex Couples Are Seeking
Barbara Cox
California Western School of Law, bjc@cwsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Barbara J. Cox, “A Painful Process of Waiting”: The New York, Washington, New Jersey, and Maryland
Dissenting Justices Understand that “Same-Sex Marriage” is Not What Same-Sex Couples Are Seeking, 45
CAL. W. L. REV. 139 (2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

ESSAY
"A PAINFUL PROCESS OF WAITING":* THE NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, NEW JERSEY, AND MARYLAND DISSENTING
JUSTICES UNDERSTAND THAT "SAME-SEX MARRIAGE" IS
NOT WHAT SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE SEEKING
BARBARA J. COX**

This essay focuses on the recent decisions by the highest courts of
four states rejecting the claims of individuals in same-sex
relationships that they must be permitted to marry the partner of their
choice. In the cases of Hernandez v. Robles,1 Andersen v. King
County,2 Lewis v. Harris,3 and Conaway v. Deane,4 a majority or
plurality of each court determined that the bans preventing individuals
were
constitutional.
from marrying
couples
in same-sex
Understanding these cases is particularly important as additional state

* Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1025 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J.,
dissenting). Justice Fairhurst was describing how same-sex couples should not be
forced to go through "the same painful process of waiting for popular opinion to
catch up with the constitution to declare denial of the right to marry
unconstitutional" that interracial couples had to go through while waiting for public
opinion to recognize that anti-miscegenation laws were "pure ignorance,
discrimination, and hate." Id.
** Clara Shortridge Foltz Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law. I would like to thank Patrick Wingfield, Class of 2009, for his excellent
research assistance and editing, and Mollie Martinek for her helpful comments made
on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank Peg Habetler, my spouse, for her
continued support and encouragement.
1. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
2. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
3. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
4. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
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supreme courts address the cases of similar plaintiffs pending before
them. Currently, the Iowa Supreme Court is considering an appeal by
same-sex couples to be allowed to marry their partners. 5
Additionally, marriage equality for same-sex couples has
broadened significantly since those four courts issued their decisions.
In May 2008, the California Supreme Court released its opinion
concerning the consolidated appeals arising after Mayor Gavin
Newsom ordered the City of San Francisco to begin issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples in 2004.6 The California Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he constitutionally based right to marry properly must be
understood to encompass the core set of basic substantive legal
rights and attributes traditionally associated with marriage that are
so integral to an individual's liberty and personal autonomy that
they may not be eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature or by
the electorate through the statutory initiative process ....
We
therefore conclude that ... the California Constitution properly
must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all
Californians, whether gay or heterosexual,
and to same-sex couples
7
as well as opposite-sex couples.

On October 10, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
limiting same-sex couples to civil unions and denying them the

5. Vamum v. Brien, No. CV 5965 (D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2007) (order granting
motion for summary judgment).
6. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, rev'd, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
This consolidated appeal of six separate cases includes the suit by the City and
County of San Francisco against the State of California following the California
Supreme Court's decision ending and invalidating the marriage licenses issued in
San Francisco in 2004. Id.; see also Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco,

95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
7. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399-400 (Cal. 2008). This case was
released while this essay was being prepared for publication. Although it is
impossible to incorporate the court's opinion at this time, references are noted when
the decision is particularly relevant to the issues raised by the essay. Furthermore, as
this essay was preparing for press, the citizens of California adopted Proposition 8
by a 52% to 48% margin, which amended the California Constitution, overruled the
California Supreme Court decision, and excluded same-sex couples from marriage.
State
Election
Results,
Election
Center
2008,
CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/state/#CA (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
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8
freedom to marry violated the Connecticut equal protection clause.
Massachusetts also opened marriage to same-sex couples from other
jurisdictions with the repeal of its 1913 statute that permitted couples
to marry in Massachusetts only when they were permitted to marry in
their domicile. 9 Thus, same-sex couples from across the country will
now be able to marry regardless of where they live. l° These
developments underscore the importance of understanding the
reasoning used by different justices when deciding whether
individuals in same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry
their partners. The decisions from New York, Washington, New
Jersey, and Maryland become even more important as other courts,
legislatures, and the public continue to consider these issues.
Each opinion, whether majority, plurality, or dissent, grapples
with the appropriate level of scrutiny to be used when considering
state laws that prevent individuals in same-sex couples from marrying.
For example, in Conaway, seventeen pages in the majority opinion
and thirty-six pages in the dissenting opinions are spent discussing
whether the ban violates Maryland's equal rights amendment and
therefore requires strict scrutiny. " In each case, the arguments

8. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, No. 17716, 2008 WL 4530885, at *47
(Conn. Oct. 28, 2008) ("Interpreting our state constitutional provisions in
accordance with firmly established equal protection principles leads inevitably to the
conclusion that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise qualified same sex
partner of their choice. To decide otherwise would require us to apply one set of
constitutional principles to gay persons and another to all others. The guarantee of
equal protection under the law, and our obligation to uphold that command, forbids
us from doing so. In accordance with these state constitutional requirements, same
sex couples cannot be denied the freedom to marry.").
9. Michael Levenson, Governor Signs Law Allowing Out-of-State Gays to
Wed, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/local/
breakingnews/2008/07/gov to sign bil.html.
10. Whether those marriages will be recognized by their home states is
unknown. For a discussion of the issues arising from interstate recognition of
marriages of same-sex couples in states other their home domicile, see ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS

STATE LINES (2006).

11. Compare Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 585-602 (Md. 2007), with id.
at 655-89 (Battaglia, J., dissenting), and id. at 693-94 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). The
Maryland majority opinion also spends another fourteen pages determining that the
laws are not entitled to strict scrutiny because the plaintiffs are not members of a
suspect class. Id. at 602-16 (majority opinion).
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presented by the dissenting justices1 2 are more cogent and persuasive.
As explained below, statutes excluding individuals in same-sex
couples from marriage violate each individual's fundamental right to
marry the person of his or her choice. Thus, such statutes should be
subject to strict scrutiny.' 3 But, I leave the in-depth analysis of these
issues to other writers. t4 Instead, this essay focuses on the dissenting
justices' understanding of why each plaintiff was seeking to marry his
or her partner. In contrast, the majority and plurality justices work
hard to convince the citizens of their states that individuals in samesex couples are not entitled to the fundamental right to marry
protected by our state and Federal Constitutions. Since the majority
and plurality justices find no fundamental right is violated, they

subject the States' rationales for banning these individuals from
marrying to mere rational basis review. This step is vital because of

12. This essay refers to all the justices or judges of these states' highest courts
as justices when referring to all four courts together to simplify the language used.
Their actual titles are used when discussing each case individually. They are known
as justices on the New Jersey and Washington Supreme Courts and as judges on the
New York and Maryland Courts of Appeals. All four courts are the highest court in
each state.
13. See infra section I(A).
14. See, e.g., Mary Bonauto, Ending Marriage Discrimination:A Work in
Progress, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 813, 843-56 (2007) (discussing Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) and Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963
(Wash. 2006)); John B. Mitchell, Chatting with the Lady in the Grocery Store About
Hemandez v. Robles, The New York Same-Sex Marriage Case, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 255 (2007); Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches
Towards MarriageEquality in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a
Detour?, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 291 (2007); Thomas Hoff Prol, New Jersey's Civil
Unions Law: A Constitutional "Equal" Creates Inequality, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
169 (2008); Yvonne A. Tamayo, I Just Can't Handle It: The Case of Hernandez v.
Robles, 28 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 61 (2007); Dov Berger, Note, Separating Civil
Unions and Religious Marriage-A New Paradigm for Recognizing Same-Sex
Relationships, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y. & ETHICS J. 163 (2007); Sarah Eaton,
Note, Lewis v. Harris: Same-Sex Marriageis a Questionfor the Legislature, Not the
Courts, 16 LAW & SEX. 157 (2007); Matthew K. Yan, Note, "What's in a Name?":
Why the New Jersey Equal Protection Guarantee Requires Full Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 179 (2007); Sigrid Ulve, Note,
Hernandez

v. Robles and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health:

The

Irrationality of the Rational Basis Test, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 149 (2007);
Robert M. Zaleski, Commentary, What's In a Name? Civil Union Fails the Test, 188
N.J.L.J. 23 (2007).
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the feebleness of the rationales used to justify the bans. Rather than
leaving the reader with respect for marriage and the important role the
institution plays in our society, one almost feels sorrow about the
circumscribed purpose left for marriage after these courts and state
governments do their best to retain it as an exclusively heterosexual
institution. Instead of celebrating the importance that these plaintiffs
ascribe to marriage, the majority and plurality opinions leave the
reader saddened by the harm done to marriage by continuing its
exclusive nature. It is the dissenting opinions that show respect for
marriage and understand why the plaintiffs seek this important choice
that is denied to them.
The first section of this essay discusses how the constant use of
the term, "same-sex marriage," by advocates and opponents alike,
seems to have convinced each majority or plurality that the plaintiffs
were not seeking recognition of their fundamental right to marry, but
instead were seeking a new fundamental right to "same-sex marriage."
By framing the question so narrowly, rather than asking whether the
fundamental right to marry is violated by refusing to allow individuals
in same-sex couples to marry, the courts err when analyzing these
bans. Since they do not believe that "a right to same-sex marriage"
can be seen as fundamental, they deny each individual in a same-sex
couple the opportunity to marry the one person he or she chooses to
marry.
The second section looks closely at the primary dissenting
opinions from New York, Washington, and New Jersey, 5 focusing on
why those justices concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional right to
marry was violated. 16 In particular, this section focuses on why the
15.

I have chosen not to analyze the Maryland Supreme Court's opinion

closely for two reasons. First, as noted previously, supra note 11, that court spends
much of its lengthy opinions debating whether Maryland's interpretation of its equal
rights amendment and equal protection clause in previous cases requires it to uphold

or strike down section 2-201 of the Family Law Code that states "[o]nly a marriage
between a man and a woman is valid in this State." Second, Conaway was issued
almost a year after the other three cases and all the opinions include significant
references to the other courts' opinions. However, some points are particularly
persuasive and will be noted throughout this essay.
16. In Hernandez, the court considered whether limiting marriage to
individuals in opposite-sex couples is valid under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the New York Constitution. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d
1, 6 (N.Y. 2006). In Andersen, the plaintiffs challenged Washington's Defense of
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dissenting justices of each court rejected the rationales espoused by
the states, and accepted by the majorities or pluralities, in support of
each state's refusal to allow individuals in same-sex couples to marry
while allowing those in opposite-sex couples to do so. While the
dissenting justices concluded that the statutes should be subject to
strict scrutiny for violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, each
also determined that the states' rationales for continuing the ban
would not survive even rational scrutiny. 17
Section three discusses how the effort to distinguish opposite-sex
couples from same-sex couples, so that the former may marry while
the latter may not, has denigrated the institution of marriage.
Opponents of "same-sex marriage" claim that marriage as an
institution needs to be "defended" from the harm that would be caused
by allowing individuals in same-sex couples to marry.18 Instead, it is
the proponents for continuing the ban who describe marriage in such
limited ways as to rob it of much of its possibility. Their willingness
to retain marriage for only opposite-sex couples by accepting any
Marriage Act as violating their fundamental right to marry, their rights under the
privileges and immunities and due process clauses of the Washington Constitution,
their privacy rights, and the state's equal rights amendment. Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006). In Lewis, the plaintiffs challenged the
denial of their fundamental right to marry and violation of the equal protection
clause under the New Jersey Constitution. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J.
2006). In Conaway, the plaintiffs claimed that the denial of marriage licenses
violated that state's equal rights amendment, and inhibited and burdened their
fundamental rights to marriage, privacy, autonomy, and intimate association under
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 583 (Md. 2007).
17. While many of the rationales are not closely tailored and are both overinclusive and under-inclusive and as such would fail strict scrutiny review, the
dissenting opinions do not limit their analysis to this review, but also reject the
rationales under rational basis review. See discussion infra section I.
18. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)) [hereinafter DOMA];
see also Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and
Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2165-94 (2005)
(providing language of "Defense of Marriage" statutes and constitutional
amendments in 43 states); Conaway, 933 A.2d at 627 n.67 (listing statutes and
constitutional amendments). As Justice Fairhurst noted, "[m]any individuals and
organizations have prophesized the downfall of society as we know it if and when
Washington recognizes that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex
couples." Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1026 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
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conceivable rationale to do so underscores the harm caused by
continuing discrimination when faced with reasonable, fair-minded
challenges. Ultimately, it is the dissenting justices' opinions that best
protect marriage and it is how the dissenting justices understand
marriage that best explains why individuals in same-sex couples seek
the right to choose it for ourselves. 19
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE IN FRAMING THE ISSUE FOR
MARRIAGE EQUALITY

After reading why these four states' highest courts rejected the
plaintiffs' claims that the bans preventing marriage equality violated
their constitutional rights, those of us who advocate for such rights
have discovered that our language may have prevented the justices
from understanding their claims. The New York, Washington, New
Jersey, and Maryland courts all rejected the claim that individuals in
same-sex couples should have the same fundamental right to marry
that individuals in opposite-sex couples enjoy. Each court framed the
question as whether the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to "samesex marriage." When narrowed in this way, it seemed clear to the
pluralities or majorities, although not to the dissents, that such a right
has not traditionally existed in their states, and thus does not exist
now. But this analysis, rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas,20 is not persuasive. The California Supreme Court
agreed. As that court recently held:
19. My spouse, Peg Habetler, and I were married in Canada in July 2003, are
registered domestic partners in Madison, Wisconsin, and California, and had a
private commitment ceremony in 1992. From June 17, 2008 until November 4,
2008, our marriage was valid and recognized in California following the California
Supreme Court's decision. See Barbara J. Cox, Equal Rights are Now Promised
Every Californian,SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 16, 2008 at B5. But see supra

note 7 (explaining how Proposition 8 overruled the California Supreme Court
decision). Our marriage is not recognized by most states in the country or by the
federal government. A description of why we chose to marry, even after receiving
comprehensive domestic partnership rights, can be found in Barbara J. Cox, Using
an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of
Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13
WIDENER L.J. 699, 702-06 (2004) and Barbara J. Cox, A (Personal)Essay on SameSex Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 27-29

(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state sodomy
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In Perez v. Sharp-this court's 1948 decision holding that the
California statutory provisions prohibiting interracial marriage were
unconstitutional-the court did not characterize the constitutional
right that the plaintiffs in that case sought to obtain as "a right to
interracial marriage" and did not dismiss the plaintiffs'
constitutional challenge on the ground that such marriages never
had been permitted in California. Instead, the Perez decision
focused on the substance of the constitutional right at issue-that
is, the importance to an individual of the freedom "to join in
marriage with the person of one's choice" - in determining whether
the statute impinged upon the plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional
2
right. '

A. The Mistake Caused by Referring to "Same-Sex Marriage"
When first starting to advocate for marriage equality, I too, used
the term "same-sex marriage" in my articles. For example, in 1994,
when I wrote one of the first articles about interstate recognition of
same-sex couples' marriages celebrated in one state by couples
domiciled in another state, I titled the article: Same-Sex Marriageand
Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When
We Return Home? 22 Although the Hawaii Supreme Court found that
banning same-sex couples from entering into marriages violated the
plaintiffs' equal protection rights, the court refused to find that
23
individuals in same-sex couples enjoy a fundamental right to marry.
statutes as violating the U.S. Constitution). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 722-723 (1997) (criticizing the lower federal court for defining the right at
issue in the case too broadly as "a right to die," when the Court thought the issue
was "a right to commit suicide" and have assistance in doing so). See also
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976-77; Lewis, 908 A.2d at 207;
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 618; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 459-60 (Cal. 2008)

(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (all using Glucksberg as support for framing
the issue as "whether there is a fundamental right to enter into a same-sex
marriage"). Of course, Lawrence is more recent than Glucksberg, and thus provides
better guidance on how best to frame these issues.
21. In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 420 (citing Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17
(1948)).
22. Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriageand Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in
Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033

[hereinafter If We Marry].
23. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993). The court asked the question

2008]

"A PAINFUL PROCESS OF WAITING"

I likened the Baehr court's mistake to that of the United States
Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 4 almost ten years before the
Supreme Court agreed, in Lawrence v. Texas, 25 that the Bowers Court
had erred. In Bowers, the Supreme Court questioned whether "the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy" 26 instead of asking whether the Constitution
recognized a fundamental right to privacy in the choice of one's
sexual partners.27 In overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court
explained:
That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court's own failure
to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would
demean a married couple were it28 said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse.
Even while discussing the Baehr court's error, I did not recognize
that I was making one myself. By repeatedly referring to what
individuals in same-sex couples are seeking as "same-sex marriage"
instead of marriage equality or the freedom to marry, I may have
contributed to the problem that this essay now critiques. When those
of us who advocate for marriage equality refer to the marriages we
want as "same-sex marriage" or "gay marriage, '"29 we may be
encouraging the courts, the legislatures, and the public to understand
what we are seeking as something different from the fundamental
right to marry that individuals in opposite-sex couples enjoy. Now that
the Lawrence Court has exposed the Bowers Court's error, we must
whether "same-sex couples possess a fundamental right to marry." Id.
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

25. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
26.
27.
28.
29.

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
If We Marry, supra note 22, at 1056-57.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy

Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 Q.L.R. 61 (1996) [herineafter

Public Policy Exception]; Cox, The Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage as an
Expression of Radical and PluralDemocracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 155 (1997); Cox,
"The Little Project": From Alternative Families to Domestic Partnershipsto SameSex Marriage,15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2000).
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continually explain this error to those from whom we seek marriage
equality.
Of course, I am not the only person who used the term "same-sex
marriage" or "gay marriage." A search for articles using either of
these terms resulted in thousands of references. 30 One of the earliest
symposia on these issues was entitled "Extraterritorial Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage: When Theory Confronts Praxis." It was held in
1996 at Quinnipiac College School of Law and the first nine articles in
the published remarks all include references to "same-sex marriage"
or "gay marriage. 31 Of all the scholars and activists present during
that symposium, only Evan Wolfson, now Executive Director of
32
Freedom to Marry, did not include these terms in his talk or articles.
B. "Freedom to Marry" Rather than "Same-Sex Marriage"
From the beginning, Evan Wolfson has been talking about the
freedom to marry for same-sex couples. As early as 1996, when he
prepared to go to trial as one of the plaintiffs' attorneys in the remand
from the Hawaii Supreme Court in the Baehr case, Wolfson used this
term while explaining why the State's attorneys were unable to
explain convincingly Hawaii's reasons for preventing individuals in
same-sex couples from marrying. 33 Recently, on February 12, 2008,
National Freedom to Marry Day, Wolfson published an article entitled
34
'Today is Freedom to Marry Day-Just Don't Say 'Gay Marriage.'

30. My research assistant, Patrick Wingfield, did a search using the terms
"same-sex marriage" and found over 4000 documents on Westlaw and over 3000
documents on Lexis. The search was run on April 6, 2008. Results are on file with
the author.
31. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Extraterritorial Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage: When Theory Confronts Praxis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (1996).
32. In the interest of full disclosure, I have co-chaired the Executive
Committee and the Steering Committee of the national Freedom to Marry
organization since it began in 2003. This organization is the only national
organization whose sole purpose is to win the freedom to marry for same-sex
couples. It was imagined and created by Evan Wolfson and he continues to serve as
its Executive Director.
33. Evan Wolfson, The Freedom to Marry: Our Struggle for the Map of the
Country, 16 Q.L.R. 209, 210 (1996).
34. Evan Wolfson, Today is Freedom to Marry Day-Just Don't Say "Gay
Marriage"!, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-wolfson/today-is-
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As he explained, same-sex couples are not seeking "gay marriage."
"We are working to win the freedom to marry, ending the current
unfair denial of marriage to those who are already doing the work of
marriage in their own lives." 35 Using phrases such as "gay marriage"
or "same-sex marriage" is harmful because they "imply that same-sex
couples deserve something different or lesser than the security,
36
protections, safety-net, and respect that married couples cherish.
Contrary to claims by opponents, same-sex couples are not
seeking to redefine marriage. As we celebrate the 60th anniversary of
Perez v. Sharp,37 where the California Supreme Court struck down the
ban preventing individuals in interracial couples from marrying and
declared that "the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with
the person of one's choice," 38 it is clear that same-sex couples are
seeking the right to marry in the same way that interracial couples
sought it before us. In fact, according to Wolfson, if "gay marriage"
exists, it is found in the civil unions and domestic partnerships where
states separate same-sex couples from the opposite-sex couples who
are entitled to "marriage itself." 39 Although same-sex couples receive
important recognition and protections in California, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, in all of
these states; "awareness is deepening [that] civil unions don't work,

freedom-to-marry, b86282.html.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), sub nom. Perez v. Lippold, 198
P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).

38. Id. at 19. Wolfson noted that the same-sex couples then before the
California Supreme Court seeking the freedom to marry were "not seeking 'gay
marriage,' any more than Mrs. Perez sought 'black marriage' or her husband sought
'Latino marriage.' Wolfson, supra note 34. In referring to Perez and other
California marriage cases, the California Supreme Court noted: "[t]he right to marry
represents the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the
person of one's choice, and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society
and to the individual." In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008).
39.

Wolfson, supra note 34. But see Greg Johnson, Civil Union,A Reappraisal,

30 VT. L. REV.891 (2006); Greg Johnson, In Praiseof Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L.
REV. 315 (2002); Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of
Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15 (2000) (all arguing that civil unions provide equal
rights as marriage and are good alternatives to marriage for same-sex couples).
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separate is not equal, and it's time to finish the job of ending exclusion
from marriage, not just repackaging it."40
C. How Using the Term, "Same-Sex Marriage," has Misshaped the
Courts' Understandingof What the Plaintiffs Seek
It might be possible to conclude that these linguistic niceties are
not all that important. Surely, it should not matter whether we talk
about the freedom to marry or marriage equality, instead of "same-sex
marriage" or "gay marriage." It seems obvious that courts, especially a
state's highest court, should understand that recognizing the
fundamental right of individuals in same-sex couples to marry should
not depend on the language used when seeking that right. But, after
reading these four decisions rejecting such a right, the majority or
plurality justices do seem to interpret "same-sex marriage" to be
something different from the "marriages" of opposite-sex couples.
One realizes as well, that by working so hard to accept the reasons
proffered by the states to differentiate between marriages of oppositesex couples and marriages of same-sex couples, the pluralities and
majorities end up diminishing "marriage" beyond even the worst fears
of those who believe that heterosexual marriages need to be
defended.41 The next section looks closely at the dissenting opinions
and demonstrates that more harm is done to "marriage" by the
majorities' and pluralities' efforts to restrict it than would occur if
same-sex couples were simply allowed access to it.
II. SAME-SEX COUPLES WANT MARRIAGE AS UNDERSTOOD BY THE
DISSENTS, NOT BY THE MAJORITIES

After re-reading all four supreme court opinions in one sitting, I
realized that "marriage," as described by the dissenting justices,
sounded much more like the marriage that my partner and I have.
Each dissenting justice's opinion expressed a belief in marriage
resembling those expressed in precedent from the United States
40. Wolfson, supra note 34; see also infra section II(C) (discussing the
findings of the New Jersey Commission on Civil Unions and detailing significant
problems with that institution).
41. See, e.g., DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
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Supreme Court, the Ontario Supreme Court, and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.4 2
In contrast, "marriage," as constricted by the pluralities' and
majorities' efforts to emphasize those few, limited spaces where it
might differ between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples,
cannot be reconciled with the eloquent, inspiring language from these
earlier cases. Instead, in these four cases, marriage has become
something needed by government to harness the casual, sexual
appetites of heterosexual couples and to repair the problems that arise
from their sexual conduct.
This section analyzes the dissenting opinions of New York Court
of Appeals Chief Judge Judith A. Kaye, Washington Supreme Court
Justice Mary E. Fairhurst, and New Jersey Supreme Court Chief
Justice Deborah T. Poritz as each rejected their colleagues' decisions
to retain the bans preventing individuals in same-sex couples from
marrying.4 3 While the discussion of each opinion spends some time

42. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) ("[M]arriages ... are
expressions of emotional support and public commitment."); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness ..
"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
("Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) ("We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race."); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949
(Mass. 2003) ("Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with another
[person] of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of our
community's most rewarding and cherished institutions."); Halpern v. Toronto,
[2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 196 (Can.) (holding that the government failed to show how
a ban on marriage of same-sex couples is "reasonable and justified in a free and
democratic society").
43. It is hard to ignore that women wrote these three dissenting opinions. It
would be interesting to speculate on why these women understood the plaintiffs'
claims better than some of their male colleagues. (The concurring and dissenting
judges in the Maryland case were Judges Irma S. Baker, Lynne A. Battaglia, and
Robert M. Bell.) Justice Barbara Madsen wrote the majority opinion in Washington.
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). Perhaps it is the
discrimination each is likely to have encountered on her way to her state's highest
court. Regardless of the reason, these three women's opinions show a remarkable
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focused on the disagreement between the justices on the correct level
of scrutiny, it spends more time on each justice's understanding of
marriage in such a way that would support opening it to individuals in
same-sex couples.
A. Hernandez v. Robles
Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye dissented from the plurality's opinion
in an eloquent, persuasive opinion that exposed the fallacies within the
plurality's conclusion that banning individuals in same-sex couples
from marrying does not violate the New York Constitution.44 Noting
that the Due Process Clauses of both the state and Federal
Constitutions protect the fundamental right to marry, she cited prior
New York cases declaring that "'clearly falling within (the right of
privacy) are matters relating to the decision of whom one will
marry,' 45 and "'the government has been prevented from interfering
46
with an individual's decision about whom to marry.'
Chief Judge Kaye chided the plurality for framing the plaintiffs'
lawsuit as requiring the court to recognize a "'new' right to same-sex
marriage,, 47 explaining that, once fundamental rights are recognized,
they "cannot be denied to particular groups on the ground that these
groups have historically been denied those rights. 48 Using the
reasoning outlined above for why the Lawrence Court overruled
Bowers,4 9 she found that the Hernandez plurality made the same

mistake.
An asserted liberty interest is not to be characterized so narrowly as
to make inevitable the conclusion that the claimed right could not
be fundamental because historically it has been denied to those who

understanding of marriage not found in many courts' decisions.
44. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22-34 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting). Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick joined in Chief Judge Kaye's
dissent. Id. at 34.

45. Id. at 23 (quoting Crosby v. State Workers' Comp. Bd., 442 N.E.2d 1191,
1194 (N.Y. 1982)).
46. Id. (quoting People v. Shepard, 409 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1980)).
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. See supra section I(A).
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now seek to exercise it .... Simply put, fundamental rights are
fundamental rights. They are not defined in terms of who is entitled
50
to exercise them.

As was true with the ban preventing individuals in interracial
couples from marrying, Chief Judge Kaye explained that the history of
excluding individuals from expressing their fundamental rights cannot
be the basis for denying them access to those rights once they
challenge their exclusion. 51 Noting that 96% of Americans were
opposed to interracial couples' marriages ten years before Loving v.
Virginia52 struck down the remaining anti-miscegenation statutes in
the country, Chief Judge Kaye found many of the same arguments
used then being used now to exclude same-sex couples from
marriage.5 3 Illustrating the significant shift that occurred in access to
marriage just forty years ago, she noted that "during the lifetime of
every Judge on this Court, interracial marriage was forbidden in at
least a third of American jurisdictions.- 54 Rejecting as circular the
notion that "same-sex couples can be excluded from marriage because
'marriage,' by definition, does not include them," Chief Judge Kaye
concluded that "[t]he long duration of a constitutional wrong cannot
justify its perpetuation, no matter how strongly tradition or public
' 55
sentiment might support it.
After finding that the plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry was
violated by preventing them from marrying the person of their choice,
Chief Judge Kaye next explained that same-sex couples' exclusion
from marriage also violated their individual equal protection rights.56
50. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 23-24 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 23; see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 430 (Cal. 2008)
(citing Chief Judge Kaye's opinion).
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
53. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 20.
54. Id. at 25. New York was one of eighteen states that did not ban such
marriages in 1948, when the California Supreme Court became the first court in the
country to strike down its ban in Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). Id.; see
also Suzanne B. Goldberg, And Justicefor All? Litigation, Politics, and the State of
MarriageEquality Today, 1 ADVANCE 33, 47 (2007) (noting the "tremendous public
pressure" placed on the California Supreme Court not to overturn the state's ban
preventing interracial couples from marrying).
55. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 26.
56. Id. at 27.
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She said that, properly framed, the question before the court was
whether any legitimate basis existed for excluding individuals in
57
same-sex couples from the state's Domestic Relations Law.
Although she believed that the exclusion should be analyzed under
heightened scrutiny, 58 she found the exclusion could not survive even
rational basis review because it did not further any legitimate state
interest. 59 Chief Judge Kaye stated that:
[I]t is not enough that the State have a legitimate interest in
recognizing or supporting opposite-sex marriages. The relevant

question here is whether there exists a rational basis for excluding
same-sex couples from marriage, and in fact, whether the State's
interests in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex marriages are
rationally furthered by the exclusion. 6u

Chief Judge Kaye's dissent was all the more persuasive because
of the feebleness of the State of New York's reasons for banning
individuals in same-sex couples from marrying. The plurality stated:
[T]he current definition of marriage is rationally related to the
State's legitimate interest in channeling opposite-sex relationships
57. Id.

58. Kaye made three arguments for heightened scrutiny: sexual orientation
discrimination should be considered using a "suspect" class analysis and thus
entitled to heightened scrutiny; exclusion from marriage is based on sex
discrimination (already entitled to heightened scrutiny); and violation of the
fundamental right to marry requires heightened scrutiny of the legislature's
reasoning. Id. at 27-30.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id.; see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 650 n.25 (Md. 2007)
(Raker, J., concurring). Noting that "Maryland's equal protection jurisprudence
requires that the legislative distinction further a legitimate state interest," Justice
Raker cited Chief Judge Kaye on whether a rational basis exists for excluding
individuals in same-sex couples from marriage, and concluded that "the State's
proffered interest-providing a stable environment for procreation and child
rearing-is actually compromised by denying same-sex families the benefits and
rights that flow from marriage." Id. at 650. But see Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963, 969 n.2 (Wash. 2006). Justice Madsen's plurality opinion noted: "Justice
Fairhurst's dissent attempts to shift the focus from whether limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples furthers these interests to whether excluding same-sex couples
furthers these interests. By doing so the dissent fails to give the legislature the
deference required under the constitution." Id.
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into marriage because of the natural propensity of sexual contact
between opposite-sex couples to result in pregnancy and
childbirth. 6 '
While acknowledging that marriage also serves "individual
interests ... such as companionship and emotional fulfillment," the
plurality concluded that marriage "was instituted to address the fact
that sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can result in
62
pregnancy and childbirth.,
The plurality also found persuasive the dissenting opinion of
Justice Robert J. Cordy in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
where he noted that one of the functions of marriage is to serve as a
"mechanism for coping with the fact that [heterosexual] sexual
intercourse commonly results in pregnancy and childbirth., 63 The
Hernandez plurality described marriage as an institution needed
primarily to address the results from the casual sexual conduct of
opposite-sex couples.
It is not irrational for the Legislature to provide an incentive for
opposite-sex couples-for whom children may be conceived from
casual, even momentary intimate relationships-to marry, create a
family environment, and support their children.... The Legislature
has granted the benefits (and responsibilities) of marriage to the
class-opposite-sex couples-that it concluded most required the
privileges and burdens64 the institution entails due to inherent
procreative capabilities.
Chief Judge Kaye forcefully rejected the plurality's reasoning,
stating that, while encouraging procreation within marriage is a
legitimate state interest, excluding individuals in same-sex couples
from marriage in no way furthers that interest. 65 While noting the
many ways the Legislature could promote procreation in marriage,
such as providing tax breaks, subsidized child care, or mandated
family leave to married couples who procreate, she argued that "no
61. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 21.
62. Id.
63.
(Cordy,
64.
65.

Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass. 2003)
J.,
dissenting).
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 21-22.
Id. at 30-31.
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one rationally decides to have children because gays and lesbians are
66
excluded from marriage."
Chief Judge Kaye understood the United States Supreme Court
case of Turner v. Safley to have established that "procreation is not the
sine qua non of marriage" because prisoners were permitted to marry
despite their inability to engage in sexual conduct. 67 Unlike the
Hernandez plurality, the Turner Court recognized that "many
important attributes of marriage remain" even assuming the
limitations of prison life, such as marriage's "expressions of emotional
support and public commitment." 68 Judge Kaye explained:
Marriage is about much more than producing children, yet samesex couples are excluded from the entire spectrum of protections
that come with civil marriage-purportedly to encourage other
people to procreate. Indeed, the protections that the State gives to
couples who do marry-such as the right to own property as a unit
or to make medical decisions for each other-are focused largely
on the adult relationship, rather than on the couple's possible role as
parents. Nor does the plurality even attempt to explain how offering
only heterosexuals the right to visit a sick loved one in the hospital,
for example, conceivably furthers the State's interest in
encouraging opposite-sex couples to have children.... The breadth
of protections that the marriagelaws make unavailableto gays and
lesbians is "so far removed" from the State's asserted goal of
promoting procreationthat the justification is, again, "impossible
to credit."69

66. Id. at 31.
67. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987), which holds that
denying a prisoner the right to marry is unconstitutional).
68. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 31. Chief Judge Kaye also pointed out that it
cannot be the ability to procreate once released from prison that underlies the
fundamental right to marry being protected for inmates, but not gays and lesbians.
Once inmates are released, they have the right to marry simply by being
nonprisoners. Id.; see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008).
69. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 31-32 (emphasis added) (citing Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432 ("None
of the past cases discussing the right to marry ...

contain any suggestion that the

constitutional right to marry is possessed only by individuals who are at risk of
producing children accidentally ... ").
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After dismissing the State's other rationales, such as moral
disapproval and tradition, for continuing the ban, Chief Judge Kaye
also rejected the State's argument that uniformity with other
jurisdictions would support the plurality's decision. She noted that six
of the seven jurisdictions bordering New York afford statewide legal
status to same-sex couples' relationships: Massachusetts and the
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec permit same-sex couples
to marry, Vermont and Connecticut provide them with civil unions,
and New Jersey provides domestic partnerships. 70 Thus, excluding
same-sex couples from the right to marry because "'others do it too' is
no more a justification for the discriminatory classification than the
contention that the discrimination is rational because it has existed for
a long time. As history has well taught us, separate is inherently
7
unequal., 1
Despite the court of appeals' decision in Hernandez, New York
has started to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples. On May
14, 2008, New York Governor David A. Patterson ordered all state
agencies to revise their policies to recognize same-sex couples'
marriages from other jurisdictions.7 2 The Governor's directive cited
the recent state appellate court decision that recognized the Canadian
marriages of same-sex couples as valid in New York.73 In 2008, two
New York lower courts recognized the Canadian marriages of samesex couples as valid in New York. In Martinez v. County of Monroe,
an appellate court determined that an employee of Monroe
Community College was entitled to obtain health benefits for her
same-sex spouse because New York was required to recognize their
marriage from Canada.7 4 The court stated that New York law
recognizes marriages solemnized outside New York unless they are
prohibited by positive law or prohibited by natural law, such as
incestuous or polygamous marriages.7 5 Otherwise, a marriage that is
70. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 33-34 (citing statutes). As of October 10, 2008,

Connecticut also permits same-sex couples to marry. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of
Pub. Health, No. 17716, 2008 WL 4530885, at *47 (Conn. Oct. 28, 2008).
71. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 34.
72. Jeremy W. Peters, New York to Back Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere,

N.Y.

TIMES,

May 29, 2008, at Al.

73. Id.
74. Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008).
75. Id. at 742.

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

valid where entered into is valid in New York.7 6 Consequently,
because Canada permits same-sex couples to marry77 and no New
York statutes prohibit recognition of marriages by same-sex couples,
the plaintiff was entitled to have her Canadian marriage recognized in
New York.7 8

The same result was reached in Beth R. v. Donna M., where the
Supreme Court of New York County held that the plaintiff was
entitled to obtain a divorce in New York of her Canadian marriage to
her same-sex spouse. 79 Since Hernandez did not address whether New
York courts should recognize valid out-of-state marriages the court
held that, absent litigation, the question should be controlled by
common law doctrines and comity. 80 New York law respects out-ofstate marriages, even if the marriage would be void if entered into
within the state, unless the marriages were "abhorrent to New York
public policy." 81 Since only incestuous marriages and polygamous
marriages have been held by New York courts to violate public policy,
there was no reason not to recognize the parties' Canadian marriage. 82
The court also considered the numerous recent "pronouncements by
statewide and local executive branch offices" as supporting the
conclusion that valid Canadian marriages between same-sex couples
must be recognized in New York. 83 Thus, the court denied defendant's
76. Id.
77. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33 (Can.); see also Halpern v. Toronto,
[2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 199-200 (Can.) (permitting individuals in same-sex couples
to marry in the Canadian province of Ontario prior to the Civil Marriage Act).
78. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 742. The defendant argued that Hernandez
determined that marriages by same-sex couples violated the state's public policy, but
the court concluded that it simply indicated that same-sex couples did not have a
constitutional right to marry within New York. Id. at 743.
79. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
80. Id. at 504.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 505. The court cited two Attorney General opinions by Elliott Spitzer
and Andrew Cuomo concluding that "parties (to same-sex marriages from other
jurisdictions) must be treated as spouses for purposes of New York law." Id. (citing
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 34-35 (2004); Godfrey v. Hevesi, No. 5896/06 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007) (reply memorandum in further support of defendant's motion to dismiss)).
Additionally, the New York State Comptroller, New York City Corporate Counsel,
and New York State Department of Civil Service all reached similar results. See
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motion to dismiss the divorce action on the grounds that the parties'
Canadian marriage was void.84
While it is distressing that the New York Court of Appeals
rejected the same-sex couples' pleas to be permitted to marry in their
home state, it appears that those couples who can afford a trip to
Massachusetts, California, or Connecticut may be able to obtain the
status they seek when they return to New York.85 Perhaps what history
teaches us is that, as discrimination slowly starts to dissipate over
time, those jurisdictions that first end the discrimination become
havens for couples prevented from marrying at home. Courts then
realize that couples are entitled to obtain externally what they are
prevented from having internally, and as more and more courts
recognize the out-of-state marriages, whether from Canada,
Massachusetts, California, or Connecticut, the number of same-sex
couples who are considered married in New York will continue to
increase.

Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 505-06 (citing Letter from Alan G. Hevesi, N.Y. State
Comptroller to Mark Daigneault, state employee (Oct. 8, 2004); Letter from Michael
A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, to Hon. Michael R. Bloomberg (Nov. 17, 2004);
Memorandum from the N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv. on Employee Benefits Div.
Policy (May 1, 2007)). A challenge to this revision by the State Civil Service was
rejected in Lewis v. New York State Department of Civil Service, No. 4078-07, 2008
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2008) (where the trial court held that
the policy memorandum was both lawful and within the Department's authority).
Also, the Governor of New York, David A. Paterson, defended the recognition of
out-of-state marriages by same-sex couples. See Joel Stashenko, N.Y Governor
Defends Recognition of Other Jurisdictions' Gay Marriages, N.Y. L.J., May 30,
2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202421798174#.
84. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 506. The court also considered the question of
parental rights to custodial care and obligations of financial support by the plaintiff
over the parties' two minor children. Ruling that the artificial insemination during
the marriage might result in the child being the legitimate child of both parents, the
court continued the case for determination in March 2008. Id at 506-09.
85. I must note some small satisfaction with these two recent cases since I have
written about interstate recognition of out-of-state marriages since 1994. The lower
New York courts used exactly the same analysis that I predicted could be used in
those initial articles. See, e.g., If We Marry, supra note 22; Public Policy Exception,
supra note 29.
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B. Andersen v. King County
Justice Mary E. Fairhurst's powerful dissent in Andersen shares
the understanding of marriage expressed by Chief Judge Kaye and the
plaintiffs in that case. 86 Justice Fairhurst found it unacceptable that the
plurality upheld Washington's exclusionary marriage statutes.
The plurality and concurrence condone blatant discrimination
against Washington's gay and lesbian citizens in the name of
encouraging procreation, marriage for individuals in relationships
that result in children, and the raising of children in homes headed
by opposite-sex parents, while ignoring the fact that denying samesex couples the87right to marry has no prospect of furthering any of
those interests.

Justice Fairhurst explained that civil marriage is the "legal status given
to individuals who seek the State's recognition of their committed
relationships," and is accompanied in Washington by at least 423
state-defined rights or duties, many of which cannot be obtained
outside of marriage. 88 More importantly, "[lt]here is no equally
respected social union. Nor is there a comparable public
acknowledgment of a couple's decision to commit their lives to each
89
other."
Clearly, the right to choose one's life partner is quintessentially the
kind of decision which our culture recognizes as personal and
important.... The relevant question is not whether same-sex
marriage is so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right,

86. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1012 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J.,
dissenting). Justices Bobbe J. Bridge, Susan Owens and Tom Chambers also joined
in Justice Fairhurst's dissent. See id. at 1027 (Bridge, J., dissenting) (chastising the
plurality for being unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of those
disenfranchised from the political process); id. at 1040 (Chambers, J., dissenting)
(questioning Justice Madsen's analytical approach toward the Washington
Constitution's privileges and immunities clause).
87. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1012-13 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(referring to id. at 983 (plurality opinion) and id. at 1006 (Alexander, C.J.,
concurring)).
88. Id. at 1013-14.
89. Id. at 1014.
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but whether the freedom
to choose one's own life partner is so
90
rooted in our traditions.
After reviewing the analysis used by Washington courts for
determining when a statute lacks a rational basis sufficient to uphold
its constitutionality, 9 ' Fairhurst discussed the State of Washington's
92
proffered interests for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.
Those interests are "encouraging procreation, encouraging marriage
90. Id. at 1022 (citing Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562
CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (unpublished order)).
91. Id. at 1015-19.
92. Id. at 1017-20. The plurality and the dissent differed on whether the
analysis should be that the State's interests must be furthered by denying marriage to
same-sex couples (dissent's view, id. at 1017), or whether they must be furthered by
allowing opposite-sex couples to marry (plurality's view, id. at 984). See also supra
note 60, indicating the same disagreement between the New York and Maryland
justices. While it is true, as the plurality stated, that "[g]ranting the right to marry to
opposite-sex couples clearly furthers the governmental interests advanced by the
State," Andersen, 138 P.3d at 984-85, doing so does not explain why those interests
are furthered by denying the right to marry to individuals in same-sex couples. Since
the State's interests can be furthered even if both sets of couples are permitted to
marry, there must be some other reason for the ban on marriage by same-sex
couples. As Justice Kaye noted, "the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from
marriage in no way furthers this interest. There are enough marriage licenses to go
around for everyone." Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye,
C.J., dissenting); see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 696 (Md. 2007) (Bell,
C.J., dissenting); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008) (both
agreeing with Justice Kaye). That is Justice Fairhurst's point: the State's reasons are
not furthered by denying marriage to individuals in same-sex couples, thus
providing no rational basis for the ban. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1018. The plaintiffs
were not seeking to end marriage for individuals in opposite-sex couples, only to
have it extended to themselves. They did not challenge the marriage statutes in
general, but only the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (see supra notes 18 and 41),
which amended RCW 26.04.010, to describe marriage as only valid if between a
male and a female, and provided in RCW 26.04.020(1)(c) that marriage is prohibited
for couples other than a male and a female. Since the plaintiffs challenged only
those statutes preventing them from marrying their same-sex partners and not the
marriage statutes extending rights to individuals in opposite-sex couples, the
plurality's statement of the issue is unpersuasive. Id. at 1015-19; see also Carlos A.
Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the
Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1184, 1203-08 (2004)
(discussing the question of whether the fundamental right to marry includes a
positive component requiring states to recognize marital relationships, beyond a
duty not to interfere with those relationships).
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for individuals in relationships that result in children, and encouraging93
the raising of children in homes headed by opposite-sex parents."
Essentially, the State argued that marriage is provided to opposite-sex
couples so they will have children, will marry when children result
from their sexual activity, and will raise their children with both a
male and a female parent in the home. 94 While the dissent questioned
whether those interests are legitimate, 95 even if they are, they focus
only on the procreative results of opposite-sex sexual activity, without
focusing on what most people would say is the real keystone of
marriage: the relationship between the adults.
Even though most people in the United States would define
"marriage" as describing the relationship with their spouse and
"family" as being more expansive to include the relationship with
their spouse, children, and extended relatives or friends, the plurality
expressly rejected this understanding.

93. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1017 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 982-85
(plurality opinion)).
94. See id. at 982-85 (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 1017 n.18 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). See also the majority opinion in
Conaway, which acknowledged that the plaintiffs' argument that Maryland's
DOMA is not rationally related to the governmental objective of fostering optimal
relationships for procreation has some merit. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 632. There, the
majority noted that, of the 104.7 million U.S. households counted by the 2000
Census Bureau, "only 24.1 percent were represented by the nuclear family (married
couples with their own children). This number represented a drastic decline from the
40 percent of all households in 1970." Id. (citing JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M.
CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
MARCH 2000, P20-537, at 3 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/

prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf). As of 2000, there were an equal number of married
households without marital children as there were with marital children. Id. "Thus,
reasonable doubt exists that the traditional model of what constitutes a family does
not constitute the majority of households any longer." Id. at 633. Despite this reality,
the Conaway majority held that legislative enactments reviewed under rational basis
scrutiny "need not be drawn with mathematical exactitude, and may contain
imperfections that result in some degree of inequality." Id. (citing Piscatelli v. Bd. of
Liquor License Comm'rs, 837 A.2d 931, 944 (Md. 2003); Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178, 185 (Md. 1985)). Justice Raker's
concurrence challenged the majority and said the law banning individuals in samesex couples from marrying "creates more than merely 'some inequality'-it creates
a grossly unequal distribution of benefits and privileges to two similarly situated
classes of people." Id. at 651 (Raker, J., concurring).

2008]

"A PAINFUL PROCESS OF WAITING"

Contrary to the view expressed in Justice Fairhurst's dissent [and
most of the United States Supreme Court's previous marriage
opinions], the right to marry is not grounded in the State's interest
in promoting loving, committed relationships. While desirable,
nowhere in any marriage statute of this state has the legislature
expressed this goal. 96
This statement is amazing. It seems that, in an effort to differentiate
between the relationships of married, opposite-sex couples and those
of same-sex couples seeking to enter into marriages, a plurality of the
Washington Supreme Court ignored the central reason why most
individuals marry: to express their hopes and dreams with the one
person with whom they hope to share their lives. Most marriage vows
say little about encouraging procreation, procreative relationships, or
families with both male and female parents. Perhaps most oppositesex couples do want to have children within their marital relationship,
but few think that is the only reason for getting married.
Most couples do not understand their marriages in these ways
because the rationales proffered by the State are unconvincing. The
State sought to continue the ban preventing individuals in same-sex
couples from marrying, and the plurality did so by focusing on those
few limited aspects of marriage that distinguish same-sex couples
from opposite-sex couples.
In contrast, Justice Fairhurst cited Griswold v. Connecticut as
providing a richer description of the marriages that most couples hope
they are entering.
"Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
living, not political
97
social projects."
The plurality's willingness to seize on the only thing in marriage that
cannot result from same-sex unions is evident while discussing the
State's reasons for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. After
noting that "partners in marriage are expected to engage in exclusive
96. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 979 n.12 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 1024 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
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sexual relations with children the probable result and paternity
presumed," the State "reasons that no other relationship has the
potential to create, without third party involvement, 98 a child
biologically related to both parents, and the legislature rationally could
decide to limit legal rights and obligations of marriage to opposite-sex
99
couples."
While deference to the legislature is required under rational basis
review,' 00 it is nonsensical to speculate that the Washington legislature
granted marriage rights to opposite-sex couples for this reason. What
is surprising is that the plurality and the State believe they are
protecting marriage and not denigrating it, even while limiting the
reasons for its existence to such a circumscribed purpose. Even if the
State's reasons were why Washington provides marriage rights,
duties, and responsibilities to married couples, it has taken a strange
approach for doing so, since a significant number of the marital rights
and duties concern only the two adults involved in the relationship and
98. Id. at 982 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 1017 n.19 (Fairhurst, J.,
dissenting) (noting that numerous infertile opposite-sex couples cannot procreate
without third party involvement through in vitro fertilization or surrogacy, but they
are allowed to marry). Countless lesbians and gay men use these same techniques to
have their own children. To provide marital benefits only to those who are able to
procreate on their own is ludicrous, as it is also mean-spirited to exclude from
marriage some who use modern medical techniques to enjoy the benefits of
parenthood, while allowing others who use those techniques to marry. See Melanie
B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341, 342-44
(2002).
99. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982 (plurality opinion).
100. Under this level of review, the plaintiffs must show that "the classification
drawn by the law is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 980.
The plurality explained that, under rational basis review, "the court may assume the
existence of any conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification," and the standard may be satisfied "where the legislative choice ...
[is] based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." Id. Of
course, use of the rational basis standard was derided by the dissent and is
questionable given the plaintiffs' claim that they were being denied their
fundamental right to marry. Id. at 1013 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); see also Conaway,
932 A.2d at 649 (Raker, J., concurring) ("[W]here a legislative enactment 'invades
protected rights to life, liberty, property or other interests secured by the
fundamental doctrines of our jurisprudence, there is reason to be especially vigilant'
in the exercise of rational basis review.") (quoting Att'y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron,
426 A.2d 929, 940 (Md. 1981)).
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not their children or their families. In fact, all of the statutes focusing
on spousal rights and duties have little importance if marriage is
understood as the plurality and the State understand it.
Again agreeing with Chief Judge Kaye, Justice Fairhurst found
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safley 01 to provide a
more accurate vision of marriage than the one described by the
Andersen plurality.1 02 Unlike the narrow vision of marriage, focusing
primarily on children, that the plurality used to exclude individuals in
same-sex couples from marriage, Justice Fairhurst focused on the
Turner Court's description of this society's shared understanding of
the fundamental right to marry. 10 3 In Turner, the Supreme Court
understood marriage to be an 'expression of emotional support and
public commitment ...[which is] an important and significant aspect

of the marital relationship,"' 104 as well as the 'religious and personal
aspects of the marriage commitment.' ' 10 5 Justice Fairhurst found
Turner most closely related to Goodridge, where the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that "'it is the exclusive and permanent
commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting
' 10 6
of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage."'
Both Turner and Goodridge more accurately describe the reasons
that most couples marry. Rather than seeing procreation and childrearing as the reason marriage plays such an important role in society,
marriage is initially, and sometimes primarily, concerned with
101. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Judge Kaye's
interpretation of Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
102. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1023 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
103. Id.

104. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96).
105. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 96).
106. Id. (quoting Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961
(Mass. 2003)). Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall noted that it
was not surprising that, historically, marriage had been a heterosexual institution
because unassisted heterosexual intercourse was the only way, except adoption, to
procreate, and children frequently resulted from heterosexual sexual conduct
because contraceptives were either unavailable or ineffective. She continued: "But it
is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that marriage must remain a
heterosexual institution because that is what it historically has been. As one dissent
acknowledges, in 'the modem age,' 'heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child
care are not necessarily conjoined."' Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-62 n.23 (quoting
id. at 995-96 (Cordy, J., dissenting)).
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creating social support for a relationship in which the adult partners
hope to love and support each other. While many marriages result in
having children, for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, it is the
relationship between the adults that allows them to create a home for
the children with whom they ultimately share their lives. Without
recognizing the adult relationship as primary, the plurality negates the
most important reason that most people marry.
The dissent then discussed several other U.S. Supreme Court
marriage cases. Without repeating that lengthy discussion here, it is
useful to consider some of Justice Fairhurst's comments. She noted
that Griswold, an opinion about the freedom of married couples to use
contraceptives, "omitted any reference to procreation or even the
gender of the spouses."' 10 7 To Fairhurst, Griswold was an important
case because it held that "the right of marital privacy included the
right not to conceive children."' 18 She concluded that "there is nothing
inherent in the fundamental right to marry that would justify a law that
excludes same-sex couples from also enjoying that right."' 10 9
Fairhurst explained that cases by individuals in same-sex couples
seeking the freedom to marry fall "at the intersection between the
fundamental right to marry and the fundamental liberty interest 1in0
making one's own personal decisions relating to intimate partners."'
This liberty interest in choosing one's partner and the members of
one's family was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in countless
cases because it involves "'the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime."" ' 1
"It is at least erroneous, if not disingenuous, for the plurality to
read the Supreme Court's repeated recognition of the fundamental
right to marry as only a means to further the fundamental right to
procreate."' 12 Even if the right to marry is linked to procreation and
child-rearing, "that link cannot be a basis to deny the right to marry to
107.
108.
109.
110.

Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1024.
Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
Id.
Id.

111. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) and citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-79 (2003); Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
112. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1023 (citing id. at 978-79 (plurality opinion)).
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same-sex couples because we allow them to adopt and rear children.
The same liberty and privacy interests historically recognized in
13
decision making pertaining to the family [are] at stake here."'
Although individuals in same-sex couples were denied the right to
marry, the Washington Legislature and Governor Chris Gregoire
expanded the rights provided to couples in domestic partnerships
significantly on March 12, 2008. Governor Gregoire signed House
Bill 3104, Expanding Rights and Responsibilities for Domestic
Partnerships, which provides more than 170 additional benefits and
4 These
responsibilities to couples in domestic partnerships. 11
additional rights will help couples protect and strengthen their
relationships, but separates them into "gay marriages," lacking many
of the rights, recognition, and responsibilities that opposite-sex
couples receive in "marriage."
C. Lewis v. Harris
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lewis differs from
both Hernandez and Andersen because the court ordered the
legislature to offer same-sex couples the same rights and benefits
enjoyed by married, opposite-sex couples."' 5 But again, the majority
rejected the notion that gay men and lesbians enjoy a fundamental
right to marry the person of their choosing if that person is a member
of the same sex.
Another difference in the Lewis case is that "[t]he State
concede[d] that state law and policy do not support the argument that
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples is necessary for either
procreative purposes or providing the optimal environment for raising
children."" 6 As the majority noted, this concession was required
because New Jersey already recognizes the rights of gay men and
lesbians to raise their own children and have foster children placed

113. Id. at 1023n.27.
114. See H.B. 3104, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008), available at
http://www.statesurge.com/bills/370386-hb3104-washington (follow "original bill"
hyperlink). The bill took effect on June 12, 2008 and makes domestic partnerships
available to same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples over the age of 62. Id.
115. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006).
116. ld. at205-06.
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with them.' 17 Instead, the State looked to "age-old traditions, beliefs,
and laws which have defined the essential nature of marriage to be the
union of a man and a woman" and argued that "same-sex marriage has
no historical roots in the traditions or collective conscience of the
' 18
people of New Jersey to give it the ranking of a fundamental right.""
Unfortunately, the majority found this argument persuasive.
Chief Justice Deborah T. Poritz concurred in the result that samesex couples must receive the rights and benefits provided to married
couples based on the equal protection clause of the New Jersey
Constitution." 9 But Poritz dissented because she could "find no
principled basis, however, on which to distinguish those rights and
benefits from the right to the title of marriage."' 120 Poritz agreed with
the majority finding that the "universally accepted fundamental right
to marriage [is] 'deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and
conscience of the people."' 121 But she challenged the majority's
formulation of the issue, saying that the question of whether a right to
"same-sex marriage" exists inappropriately narrows the question.
Under the majority opinion, it appears that persons who exercise
their individual liberty interest to choose same-sex partners can be
denied the fundamental right to participate in a state-sanctioned
civil marriage. I would hold that plaintiffs' due process122rights are
violated when the State so burdens their liberty interests.

117. Id. at 206. Unfortunately, this reasoning did not lead the New York,
Washington, and Maryland pluralities to alter their decisions to deny individuals in

same-sex couples the right to marry despite similar parenting rights existing in those
states. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (permitting second parent
adoptions); In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)

(recognizing joint adoption); see also State Pages for Washington and Maryland,
http://laInbdalegal.org/our-work/states (showing some second parent adoption rights
in Washington and Maryland and a positive climate for visitation cases in
Maryland).
118. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 205-06.
119. Id. at 224 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (Long & Zazzali, JJ.,
joined in the dissent) (citing N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1, which is equivalent to the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution).
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing id. at 200 (majority opinion)).
122. Id. at 225 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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Chief Justice Poritz understood that while the plaintiffs needed the
rights, benefits, and responsibilities that come with marriage, it was
the right to marry, and not the rights, that was their focus.
Acknowledging "another dimension to the relief plaintiffs' seek,"
Poritz recognized that they "speak of the deep and symbolic
significance to them of the institution of marriage."' 23 She began by
quoting the eloquent description of marriage that Chief Justice
Marshall used in her opinion in Goodridge:
Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another
human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family....
Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection
that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed
institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among
24
life's momentous acts of self-definition.1
Then, Poritz recognized that the plaintiffs were no less articulate
in describing their desire to marry, as expressed in the affidavits they
presented to the court:
In our relationship, Saundra and I have the same level of love and
commitment as our married friends. But being able to proudly say
that we are married is important to us. Marriage is the ultimate
expression of love, commitment, and honor that you can give to
another human being.
I am proud that Alicia and I have the courage and the values to take
on the responsibility to love and cherish and provide for each other.
When I am asked about my relationship, I want my words to match
my life, so I want to say I am married and know that my
relationship with Alicia is immediately understood, and after that
nothing more needs be explained.
Society endows the institution of marriage with not only a host of
rights and responsibilities, but with a significant respect for the
relationship of the married couple. When you say that you are
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-55
(Mass. 2003)).
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married, others know immediately that you have taken steps to
create something special. . . . The word "married" gives you
automatic membership in a vast club of people whose values are
clarified by their choice of marriage. With a marriage, everyone can
instantly relate to you and your relationship. They don't have to
wonder what kind of
relationship it is or how to refer to it or how
25
much to respect it. 1

Justice Poritz understood the plaintiffs to be expressing their
"deep yearning for inclusion, for participation, for the right to marry
in the deepest sense of that word." 126 She thought that telling the
legislature to give the plaintiffs the rights and responsibilities of
marriage while withholding the word, "marriage," and placing samesex couples into a separate statutory scheme, such as civil unions,
demeaned their request. 27 Recognizing that a separate scheme "set[s]
people apart as surely as physical separation on a bus or in school
facilities," the State was sending the message that "what same-sex
couples have is not as important or as significant as real marriage, that
128
such lesser relationships cannot have the name of marriage."
Chief Justice Poritz also found that asking about a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage so narrowed the issue as to make it
inevitable that such a right was not deeply rooted in the traditions of
the country.12 9 She found it obvious that such a right did not exist: "Of
125. Id. at 225-26. Of course, marriage is not the only way to express these
feelings and countless couples have chosen to do so outside the institution of
marriage. See, e.g.,

NANCY

D. POLIKOFF,

BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:

VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (Beacon Press 2008). The point of this

essay is not to claim marriage as the only or best locus for expressing these feelings
or to ignore that relationships outside marriage also deserve societal respect and
support. Instead, its purpose is to claim the right to marry for individuals in samesex couples if those individuals choose to express their feelings by joining this

institution.
126. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 226.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 226-27. Chief Justice Poritz referred to the Birmingham, Alabama
boycott that occurred when Rosa Parks, an African-American woman, refused to
give up her seat in the front of the bus to a white person and move to the back of the
bus where African-Americans were required to sit. She also referred to the
segregated school facilities determined to be unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Lewis, 908 A.2d at 226-27.
129. Id. at 227-28.
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course there is no history or tradition including same-sex couples; if
there were, there would have been no need to bring this case to the
courts."'1 30 Agreeing with Judge Collester's dissent in the court of
appeals opinion below, she found that the argument was circular and
believed that Loving v. Virginia should have ended any notion that
3
fundamental rights can be restricted by the traditions of the country.' '
If the Supreme Court had used Virginia's tradition of preventing
interracial couples from marrying, it would have sustained its law,
rather than finding the law to violate the couple's fundamental right to
marry.1 3 2 Instead, Loving should teach that the fundamental right to
marry cannot be limited to opposite-sex couples any more than it
33
could be limited to same-race couples. 1
Chief Justice Poritz found it to be incongruous that, following the
conclusion of this case, New Jersey's statutes would reflect "both
abhorrence of sexual orientation discrimination and a desire to prevent
same-sex couples from having access to one of society's most
cherished institutions, the institution of marriage."1' 34 In fact, she
concluded that it was not surprising that the State was reduced to
using tradition alone to justify continuing the ban because social
science data would not support using either promotion of procreation,
or the notion that heterosexual households are the optimal
environment for raising children, as bases to do so.1 35 Thus, the State,
she concluded, was left to argue "but that is the way it has always
36
been," as its only rationale for continuing the ban.'
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 228.
Id. (referring to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
Id. (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
Id.
Id. at 229-30.

135. Id. at 230 (citing Gregory N. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships in the United States: A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOL.

607, 611 (2006) (indicating that same-sex couples are increasingly forming families
into which children are conceived, born, and raised, and studies of those families
have not found reliable disparities in mental health or social adjustment of children
raised in those families)).
136. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 230. The California Supreme Court also rejected the
argument that tradition alone could support the exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage. The court noted:
[i]f we have learned anything from the significant evolution in the
prevailing societal views and official policies toward members of minority
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Chief Justice Poritz ended her dissent with a long quote from37
Professor Ronald Dworkin's essay, Three Questions for America.1
While recognizing that civil union status with the rights and benefits
of marriage would significantly lessen the discrimination that samesex couples endure in a society which bans our marriages, Dworkin
stated that it is marriage's "long traditions of historical, social, and
to replicate in a newlypersonal meaning" that make it impossible
1 38
created, separate status for these couples.
We can no more now create an alternate mode of commitment
carrying a parallel intensity of meaning than we can now create a
substitute for poetry or for love. The status of marriage is therefore
a social resource of irreplaceable value to those to whom it is
offered: it enables two people together to create value in their lives
that they could not create if that institution had never existed.... If
we allow a heterosexual couple access to that wonderful resource
but deny it to a homosexual couple, we make it possible for one
what they both believe to be an
pair but not the other to realize
39
important value in their lives. 1
Recently, Dworkin's conclusion that civil unions cannot be equal
to marriages has been confirmed by the New Jersey Civil Union
Review Commission. 140 The Commission issued its report on February
19, 2008, based on hearings held around the state on whether
providing civil unions did give same-sex couples the same rights
afforded to married couples. 14 1 The Commission's findings detailed
races and toward women over the past half-century, it is that even the most
familiar and generally accepted of social practices and traditions often
mask an unfairness and inequality that frequently is not recognized or
appreciated by those not directly harmed by those practices or traditions.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008).
137. Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19271.
138. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 231 (citing Dworkin, supra note 137, at 24, 30).
139. Id. (citing Dworkin, supra note 137, at 24, 30).
140. The Commission was created by Public Law 2006, chapter 103, as part of
the Civil Union Act establishing civil unions for individuals in same-sex couples.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-36 (West 2006).
141. See N.J. CIVIL UNION REvIEw COMM'N, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE
N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.nj.gov/oag/
dcr/downloads/lst-InterimReport-CURC.pdf [hereinafter N.J. COMM'N REPORT];
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the numerous ways in which couples in civil unions encountered
discrimination that would not have occurred had they been married.
Three of the ten findings focused on problems raised in obtaining
employment-related benefits and health insurance because employers
42
did not offer these benefits to their employees in civil unions.
Attorney Beth Robinson, Chair of Vermont Freedom to Marry and
one of the lawyers who won the case of Baker v. State, 4 3 testified that
her work with same-sex couples who entered into civil unions in
Vermont shows that these couples continue to encounter
discrimination from their employers. 144 After seven years of civil
if
unions in Vermont, Ms. Robinson testified: "it's just not true that 45
1
marriage."
with
parity
achieve
will
unions
civil
enough time passes,
She provided the example that employers failed to provide tax
exemptions on health insurance because they do not46 have the
appropriate software to recognize employees' civil unions. 1

Tina Kelley, Commission Report Cites Flaws in New Jersey Civil Union Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/nyregion/ 20union.html?
_r=-2&ref=nyregion&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
142. Frequently, the problem was the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. ch. 18, which controls the insurance plans of fifty
percent of New Jersey companies who are self-insured. Since ERISA controls these
plans and looks to federal law rather than state law, requiring equal treatment under
New Jersey law does not solve the problem for couples in civil unions. N.J. COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 141, at 6. DOMA, see supra note 18, which only recognizes
heterosexual married couples for all federal law purposes, might prevent recognition
of New Jersey marriages as well as civil unions. This same problem exists for samesex couples who are married in Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut, and are
denied federal rights available to all other married couples.
143. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
144. The Vermont legislature also created civil unions for same-sex couples,
after the Supreme Court required it to either open the marriage statutes to same-sex
couples or provide them with "some equivalent statutory alternative." Id. at 867; see
also Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage:An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions
Law, Same-Sex Marriage,and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REv. 113, 136-46
(2000) (discussing problems with portability of civil unions and denial of federal
recognition as additional reasons why civil unions are not equal to marriage).
145. N.J. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 141, at 9.
146. Id. at 10. She noted that it is impossible to know how many people
encounter these problems because they do not fully understand their rights or know
what is happening. Id. Again, these couples would not obtain federal tax relief even
if they were married, due to DOMA. See DOMA, supra note 18, § 7.
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Other findings concerned the second-class status that partners in
civil unions encounter when dealing with medical personnel, school
officials, government workers, and others in positions of authority.
Repeatedly having to explain the legal status of civil unions to others
who provide vital services is more than a mere inconvenience. Those
with whom these same-sex couples interact take their cues from the
government's decision to exclude them from marriage, thereby,
apparently endorsing discriminatory treatment against them. 147
Perhaps most distressing were the reports from the parents of
children being raised by same-sex couples. Parents testified that their
children struggled to understand why their parents could not marry,
like the parents of their friends, and one even asked his parents if
people in same-sex relationships were criminals because they could
not marry. 148 During a symposium held in 1999 at Harvard Law
School, I argued that same-sex couples should not accept domestic
partnership or civil unions as a more politically-expedient compromise
(even though they would provide those couples with necessary rights
and recognition), rather than maintaining the fight for marriage
equality, because I was afraid that exactly these harms would be
caused to our children. An important part of the Brown v. Board of
Education litigation focused on the social-science findings on how
segregation negatively impacted children of color who were prevented
from attending schools with white children.1 49 The same problems
arise for children of parents in same-sex relationships, whether
registered in civil unions or not. These children understand clearly that
society is telling them that their parents are not good enough to be
married like their friends' parents may be, and this causes repeated
and severe injury to these children.
147. See N.J. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 141, at 10-11. Testimony centered
on interactions with banks, hospitals, and even courtrooms where a judge only asked
jurors whether they were single or married, not partners in a civil union. Id. at 12-15.
148. Id. at 12. Of course, Turner v. Safley tells us that criminals can, in fact,
marry. See supra notes 67 and 68.
149. Cox, supra note 144, at 118. Psychologist Kenneth Clark's research
showed that African-American children were harmed by segregated school facilities,
saying that "the damage wrought by the mere existence of segregation causes
inequality. Separate could never be equal, no matter how comparable the separate
schools were." Id. at 118 n.27 (citing JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE:
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, 21 (1987)).
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This result is particularly problematic because the Lewis majority
specifically stated:
There is something distinctly unfair about the State recognizing the
right of same-sex couples to raise natural and adopted children and
placing foster children with those couples, and yet denying those
children the financial and social benefits and privileges available to
children in heterosexual households.... There is no rational basis
for visiting on those children a flawed and unfair scheme directed
at their parents. To the extent that families are strengthened by
encouraging monogamous relationships, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, we cannot discern any public need that would justify
the legal disabilities
that now afflict same-sex domestic
50
partnerships. 1

If the court meant what it said, one could hope that the
Commission's report would lead the state's legislature to conclude
that civil unions cannot provide equal rights to same-sex couples in
New Jersey. The majority refused to reach that conclusion, stating
instead:
Because this State has no experience with a civil union construct
that provides equal rights and benefits to same-sex couples, we will
not speculate that identical schemes called by different names
would create a distinction that would offend Article 1, Paragraph 1.
We will not presume that
a difference in name alone is of
51
constitutionalmagnitude.1
But Chief Justice Poritz anticipated the problems raised before the
Commission when she said in her dissent, "What we 'name' things
matters, language matters." 152
Human beings use labels to describe and sort their perceptions of
the world. The particular labels often chosen in American culture
can carry social and moral consequences while burying the choice
and responsibility for those consequences.... Language and labels

150. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006) (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 226 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting).
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play a special role in the perpetuation of prejudice about
differences. 153

Now that the New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission has
confirmed what Chief Justice Poritz anticipated, the New Jersey
Legislature must fulfill the requirement stated by the Lewis majorityto equalize committed, same-sex couples with their opposite-sex
counterparts-by putting an end to the separate system of civil unions
and ending the ban preventing these couples from marrying. If the
majority truly believed that equality is required by the New Jersey
Constitution, then individuals in same-sex couples must be allowed to
marry. Only in this way can the equal protection violation be cured.
III.

WHY WE WANT "MARRIAGE"

As UNDERSTOOD BY THE

DISSENTING JUSTICES

More than eleven years after my partner, Peg, and I had a private
ceremony to express our love for and pledge our long-term
commitment to one another, we were married in Canada in July 2003.
We were finally able to call ourselves spouses as of June 17, 2008,
after almost eighteen years of being together, because our home state
of California considers that marriage to be valid and recognized
here. 154 After reading these four cases, I am grateful that the marriage
we share is one that seeks to achieve the vision described by the
dissenting justices. They view marriage in much the same way that the
Ontario Court of Appeal did when it stated:
Marriage is, without dispute, one of the most significant forms of
personal relationships.... Through the institution of marriage,
individuals can publicly express their love and commitment to each
other. Through this institution, society publicly recognizes
153. Id. (citing

MARTHA MINNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,

EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 4, 6 (1990)).

154. After the November 2008 election, it is likely that our marriage is no
longer valid and recognized in the state of California, despite the California
Supreme Court decision. See supra note 7. Proposition 8 was passed by a simple
majority of voters to rewrite the California Constitution to state: "Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." California

Marriage
Protection
Act,
Prop.
8
(2008),
available
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop8.

at

2008]

"A PAINFUL PROCESS OF WAITING"

expressions of love and commitment between individuals, granting
them respect and legitimacy as a couple. This public recognition
and sanction of marital relationships reflect society's approbation of
the personal hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving,
committed conjugal relationships. This can
only enhance an
155
dignity.
and
self-worth
of
sense
individual's
This eloquent language describes an institution important enough
and flexible enough to welcome the same-sex couples who wish to
join it. Compare this with "marriage" as described by the four
plurality and majority opinions from New York, Washington, New
Jersey, and Maryland. For them, marriage is an institution that must be
protected from same-sex couples, and one that is limited to oppositesex couples either by tradition alone or to encourage solidifying those
relationships that may be based on casual sexual contact and the
children that may result. I doubt the descriptions of marriage used by
the pluralities and majorities would appeal to most opposite-sex
couples, who have been told all of their lives that marriage is
something sacred, that adults should join in marriage with the one
person with whom each chooses to share his or her life, and that
marriage embodies individuals' strongest yearnings for connection,
sharing, and love. They too probably thought that they were entering
marriages similar to those described by the dissenting justices.
As Justice Bridge stated in her Andersen dissent: "If the
[Washington] DOMA purports to further some State purpose of
preserving the family unit, as the plurality would interpret it, then I
cannot imagine better candidates to fulfill that purpose than those
same-sex couples who are the plaintiffs in these consolidated
actions." 156 It saddens me to find these courts willing to "redefine"
marriage in order to justify the exclusion of individuals in same-sex
couples. I expect these courts will rue the day they issued these
opinions, as society looks back on them with disdain and dismay, in
much the same way that we currently view the Virginia court's
opinion in Loving, and the Supreme Court's opinions in Plessy v.
157
Ferguson, Bradwell v. Illinois, and Naim v. Naim.
155. Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 167-68 (Can.).
156. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1028 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J.,
dissenting).
157. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute
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This essay has focused on the dissenting justices' opinions
because it is those justices who best understood why the plaintiff
same-sex couples were seeking the freedom to marry. When other
courts face similar challenges by same-sex couples excluded from
marriage, those courts should pay close attention to the compelling
reasoning and inspiring language used by the dissenting justices, and
embrace an inclusive vision of marriage.

requiring separate railroad carriages for white and non-white passengers); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding Illinois decision preventing women from
entering the legal profession); Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966)
(upholding Virginia anti-miscegenation statute), rev'd, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Naim v.
Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955) (upholding Virginia law banning individuals in
interracial couples from marrying), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). These earlier
decisions are now understood to be harmful errors by their courts. Compare
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 34 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) ("I am
confident that future generations will look back on today's decision as an
unfortunate misstep."), with 885 N.E.2d at 12 (majority opinion) ("We do not
predict what people will think generations from now, but we believe the present
generation should have a chance to decide the issue through its elected
representatives."), and Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1040 (Bridge, J., dissenting) ("Future
generations of justices on this court and future generations of Washingtonians will
undoubtedly look back on our holding today with regret and even shame, in the
same way that our nation now looks with shame upon our past acts of
discrimination."), with 138 P.3d at 969 (majority opinion) ("[W]hile same-sex
marriage may be the law at a future time, it will be because the people declare it to
be, not because five members of this court have dictated it.").

